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Abstract
The boomerang analysis, together with its offspring the amplified boomerang
analysis and the rectangle analysis, are techniques that are widely used in the
analysis of block ciphers. We give realistic examples which demonstrate that the
boomerang analysis can commonly give probability values that are highly inac-
curate. Thus any complexity estimates for the security of a block cipher based
on the boomerang or rectangle analysis must be viewed extremely sceptically.
1 Introduction
The boomerang analysis of [11] is an adaptation of differential cryptanalysis [2, 3]
in which quartets of encryptions and decryptions are used. Two related plaintexts
are encrypted, and the resulting pair of ciphertexts is then used to generate two
new related ciphertexts. These two new ciphertexts are then decrypted to give
two new plaintexts. The aim of the boomerang analysis is to use such quartets
of plaintexts and of ciphertexts to find key information. Furthermore, enhanced
versions of the boomerang analysis based on this idea have also been developed,
such as the amplified boomerang analysis [7] and the rectangle analysis [1].
There is however no a priori reason for the probabilistic argument of [11]
concerning the boomerang analysis, and therefore for the related analyses, to be
correct. We demonstrate this by giving simple examples using the Data Encryp-
tion Standard (DES) [8] and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [9].
The motivation for the use of the word boomerang to describe such an analysis
of quartets is given in [11].
This is why we call it the boomerang attack: when you send it properly,
it always comes back to you.
We send a DES or an AES boomerang, but our boomerang won’t come back.
2 The Boomerang Analysis
We describe the basic boomerang analysis in the manner of [11], and a schematic
diagram of the boomerang analysis, based on Figure 1 of [11], is given in Figure 1.
We base our notation on that of [11], so we suppose that E represents the block
cipher encryption under a fixed key. The basic boomerang analysis is based on
a quartet of encryptions and decryptions, and the process for generating such a
quartet is described below.
– Choose values △ and ∇.
– Choose a pair of plaintexts P and P ′ such that P + P ′ = △.
– Encrypt P and P ′ to obtain ciphertexts C = E(P ) and C′ = E(P ′).
– Obtain two further ciphertexts D = C +∇ and D′ = C′ +∇.
– Decrypt D and D′ to obtain plaintexts Q = E−1(D) and Q′ = E−1(D′).
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Fig. 1. Schematic Diagram of the Basic Boomerang Analysis.
The boomerang analysis is an attempt to use the ideas of differential crypt-
analysis [2, 3] to analyse the plaintext quartet (P, P ′, Q,Q′) and ciphertext quar-
tet (C,C′, D,D′). To this end, we consider the encryption operation in two parts,
so we may write E = E1 ◦E0. Thus E0 represents the initial part of the encryp-
tion operation, and E1 represents the final part. We let (X,X
′, Y, Y ′) denote the
intermediate result of the encryption and decryption operations, so we have:
X = E0(P ) = E
−1
1
(C), X ′ = E0(P
′) = E−1
1
(C′),
Y = E0(Q) = E
−1
1
(D), Y ′ = E0(Q
′) = E−1
1
(D′).
The basic boomerang analysis uses two differential characteristics [2, 3]. The
differential characteristic △ → △∗ is used for the initial part E0 of the overall
encryption E and the differential characteristic ∇∗ → ∇ is used for the final
part E1 of the overall encryption E, for some values △∗ and ∇∗. A quartet of
encryptions and decryptions, or equivalently the corresponding plaintext and
ciphertext quartets, is called a right quartet if the following conditions hold:
P + P ′ = Q+Q′ = △, X +X ′ = Y + Y ′ = △∗,
X + Y = X ′ + Y ′ = ∇∗, C +D = C′ +D′ = ∇.
A motivation for using this quartet of encryptions and decryptions, and for
the definition of a right quartet is given in [11].
We want to cover the pair P, P ′ with the characteristic for E0, and
to cover the pairs P,Q and P ′, Q′ with the characteristic for E−1
1
. Then
(we claim) the pair Q,Q′ is perfectly set up to use the characteristic
△∗ →△ for E−1
0
.
It is the case that
E0(Q) + E0(Q
′) = Y + Y ′ = (Y +X) + (X +X ′) + (X ′ + Y ′)
= ∇∗ +△∗ +∇∗ = △∗
is indeed a condition required to start the characteristic △∗ → △ for E−1
0
,
the inverse of the initial part of the encryption operation. However, whilst this
condition is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition, as the examples
of Section 3 and 6 demonstrate.
The statistical reasoning of the boomerang analysis given in Section 4 of [11]
states that the probability p of a right quartet satisfies
p ≥ p2
0
p2
1
,
where p0 is the probability of the differential characteristic △ → △∗ under E0
and p1 is the probability of the differential characteristic ∇ → ∇∗ under E1.
The complexity estimates for the boomerang analysis given in [11] are based
on this estimate of p. However, in both Sections 3 and 6 we give examples of
a boomerang analysis with p0, p1 > 0, but for which a right quartet can never
occur, that is p = 0.
3 A DES Boomerang
We consider a boomerang analysis on a block cipher that consists of four rounds
of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) [8]. Thus E is the encryption under some
fixed key of four rounds of the DES (without IP and IP−1), and we suppose that
E0 is the initial two rounds of this encryption and that E1 the final two rounds
of this encryption. We use the two differential characteristics used in the iterated
differential cryptanalysis of the DES [2, 3]. Thus we define
△ = △∗ = 19600000 00000000 = (γ9, 0) = δ9
and ∇ = ∇∗ = 1B600000 00000000 = (γB, 0) = δB,
so in particular we have
E0(Z) + E0(Z +△) = △∗ with probability p0 ≈
1
234
and E1(Z) + E1(Z +∇∗) = ∇ with probability p1 ≈
1
234
.
The reasoning of Section 4 of [11] would now assert that the probability of a
right quartet is at least p20p
2
1 ≈
(
1
234
)4
.
We now consider the conditions required for a right quartet to occur. Accord-
ingly, we let c, c′, d, d′ denote the four 6-bit inputs to DES S-Box 2 in the fourth
round of this cipher. Thus c, c′, d, d′ are a selection of six bits of C,C′, D,D′.
For a right quartet, we require that X + X ′ = Y + Y ′ = △∗ = δ9 and
X + Y = X ′ + Y ′ = ∇∗ = δB. Allowing for the expansion phase of the DES
round function [8], a right quartet therefore satisfies
c+ c′ = d+ d′ = 110010 and c+ d = c′ + d′ = 110110,
which gives the following relationship between the four 6-bit S-Box inputs:
c′ = c+ 110010, d = c+ 110110 and d′ = d+ 110010 = c+ 000100.
In the classical differential cryptanalysis of the DES, we require that the out-
puts of the respective pairs of S-Boxes are identical. Thus we have
S2(c) = S2(d) and S2(c
′) = S2(d
′),
where S2 : Z
6
2
→ Z4
2
is the 6-bit to 4-bit function given by DES S-Box 2. For a
right quartet to exist, we therefore require that there exists a 6-bit value c such
that
S2(c) = S2(c+ 110110) and S2(c+ 110010) = S2(c+ 000100).
It is easy to verify by a direct search of all 26 = 64 possibilities for c that no
such value for c exists.
It is is not therefore possible for a right quartet to exist in this boomerang
analysis. In other words, a right quartet exists in this boomerang analysis with
probability zero, rather than than the probability of at least p2
0
p2
1
≈
(
1
234
)4
> 0
asserted by [11]. This DES boomerang never comes back.
4 The Amplified Boomerang Analysis
The amplified boomerang analysis of [7] is an adaptation of the basic boomerang
analysis that only uses encryptions and no decryptions in a chosen plaintext
analysis. The idea is to encrypt pairs (P, P ′) or (Q,Q′) of plaintexts satisfying
P+P ′ = Q+Q′ = △. As before, we let (X,X ′) = (E0(P ), E0(P ′)) and (Y, Y ′) =
(E0(Q), E0(Q
′)) denote the intermediate values of encryptions under E. Such
intermediate values (X,X ′) or (Y, Y ′) then satisfy X+X ′ = △∗ or Y +Y ′ = △∗
with probability p0. Thus if we start with N such plaintext pairs, we expect
to obtain Np intermediate pairs with difference △∗, and so we expect to obtain
about 1
2
(Np)2 intermediate quartets (X,X ′, Y, Y ′) satisfying X+X ′ = Y +Y ′ =
△∗. It is then asserted by [7] that such an intermediate quartet also satisfies
X + Y = X ′ + Y ′ = ∇∗, the other part of the boomerang condition, uniformly
at random. The example of Section 3 shows this is not the case. There is no a
priori reason to assume that amplified boomerang analysis works in the manner
described by [7].
5 The Rectangle Analysis
The rectangle analysis of [1] is an adaptation of the amplified boomerang analysis
that considers all values for the appropriate intermediate values. We suppose that
we are considering an n-bit block cipher and we let
P = (P, P ′, Q,Q′)T , X = (X,X ′, Y, Y ′)T and C = (C,C′, D,D′)T
denote the quartet vectors at the plaintext, intermediate and ciphertext stages
respectively, so P, X and C are vectors over GF(2) of length 4n. We now let
S =
(
I I 0 0
0 0 I I
)
, T =


I I 0 0
0 0 I I
I 0 I 0
0 I 0 I

 and U =
(
I 0 I 0
0 I 0 I
)
denote the matrices over GF(2) giving the required differences at these stages,
where the defining sub-blocks are n× n matrices. Thus S and U are matrices of
rank 2n and T is a matrix of rank 3n. We let
△˜ =
(
△
△
)
, z =


z
z
z′
z′

 and ∇˜ =
(
∇
∇
)
denote the required differences at these stages, so the probability of interest for
the analysis of plaintext and ciphertext quartets is then given by
P
(
UC = ∇˜
∣∣∣SP = △˜) .
Under the assumption that the sequence of difference values (SP, TX, UC) forms
a Markov process [10], this probability is given by
P
(
UC = ∇˜
∣∣∣SP = △˜) =∑
z
P
(
UC = ∇˜
∣∣∣TX = z)P(TX = z ∣∣∣SP = △˜) .
The analysis of [1] evaluates the first term P
(
UC = ∇˜
∣∣∣TX = z) of the sum-
mand as P
(
UC = ∇˜
∣∣∣SX = (z, z)T) . We now consider the DES example of Sec-
tion 3 and take z = δ9 and z
′ = δB. We show in Section 3 that
P
(
UC = ∇˜
∣∣∣TX = z) = 0, whereas P(UC = ∇˜∣∣∣SX = (z, z)T) = p21 > 0.
The analysis of [1] would therefore give z = (δ9, δ9, δB, δB)
T as the dominant
term in the summation for P
(
UC = ∇˜
∣∣∣TX = z), whereas in fact this term is
zero in this summation. As with other analyses based on the boomerang idea,
there is no a priori reason to assume the rectangle analysis works in the manner
described by [1].
6 An AES Boomerang
We now give another cautionary example about the boomerang analysis, basing
this example on the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [5, 9]. We consider a
block cipher based on two (complete) rounds of the AES. Thus E is the encryption
under some fixed key of two rounds of the AES, and we suppose that E0 is the
initial round of this encryption and that E1 the final round of this encryption.
The only nonlinear part of an AES round is the SubBytes phase, which con-
sists of the application of an S-Box to each byte of the 16-byte state, where an
S-Box is formally a function S : Z82 → Z
8
2. The nonlinear part of an S-Box is an
“inversion” operation on bytes, given by z 7→ z2
8
−2 in GF(28), and there exist
many nonzero input byte differences α and output byte differences β such that
the differential probability for the AES S-Box is 2−7 [5, 6]. One such pair of input
and output differences for SubBytes is given by α = 02 and β = EE, so we have
P (S(z + 02) + S(z) = EE) = 2−7.
Allowing for the effect of the ShiftRows and MixColumns operations, we can
base a boomerang analysis on the differences
△ = ∇∗ = 02000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
and △∗ = ∇ = C7EEEE29 00000000 00000000 00000000 .
This gives the following differential probabilities for the two parts of the block
cipher:
E0(Z) + E0(Z +△) = △∗ with probability p0 = 2−7
and E1(Z) + E1(Z +∇∗) = ∇ with probability p1 = 2−7.
We now consider the effect of the right quartet restrictions on the possibilities
for the intermediate values. A similar analysis to Section 3 shows that:
X ′ = X+ △∗ = X + C7EEEE29 00000000 00000000 00000000,
Y = X+ ∇∗ = X + 02000000 00000000 00000000 00000000,
Y ′ = X+ △∗ +∇∗ = X + C5EEEE29 00000000 00000000 00000000.
If we let x denote the first byte of X , then for a right quartet we require that
S(x) + S(x+ 02) = EE and S(x+ C7) + S(x+ C5) = EE.
A search through all 28 possible byte values for x quickly shows that there is no
byte value x which satisfies the two above equations.
We have therefore shown that it is not possible for a right quartet to exist in
this boomerang analysis, even though the reasoning of Section 4 of [11] would
give a lower bound for the probability of a right quartet of at least p20p
2
1 = 2
−28.
Just like the DES boomerang of Section 3, this AES boomerang never comes back.
7 A High Probability DES Boomerang
We have given a DES boomerang and an AES boomerang (Sections 3 and 6) which
cannot occur, that is they happen with probability zero. In both cases, this was
demonstrated by giving a pair of S-Box equations which had no solution. Of
course, if we had set up a different potential boomerang, that is other difference
values, we would have obtained other pairs of S-Box equations, which may well
have had many solutions. In such a case, it is entirely possible that the boomerang
probability may greatly exceed that given by [11].
We illustrate this point about boomerang probabilities with a striking con-
trast to the zero-probability non-returning DES boomerang of Section 3. We sim-
ply make a minor modification of the boomerang differences for Section 3. Thus
we take ∇ = ∇∗ = △∗ = △ = δ9 rather than ∇ = ∇∗ = δB and △∗ = △ = δ9 as
for Section 3. As for this Section 3 example, the statistical reasoning of Section 4
of [11] now asserts that the probability of a right quartet is
(
1
234
)4
. The condition
for a right quartet in this case is simply then given by
P ′ = Q = Q′ + δ9 = P + δ9,
X ′ = Y = Y ′ + δ9 = X + δ9
and C′ = D = D′ + δ9 = C + δ9.
This right quartet is therefore simply the repeated use of a right pair [2, 3] in
differential cryptanalysis. Thus in this case a right quartet occurs with the same
probability as a right pair based on this characteristic, namely
(
1
234
)2
. The true
probability of this boomerang occurring is very much greater than the probability
value for this boomerang occurring given by the statistical reasoning of [11].
8 Conditional Probability and the Boomerang Analysis
A boomerang analysis requires the use of conditional probability. The condition
for a right quartet is a Rank-3n condition, as is illustrated by the matrix T (Sec-
tion 5) of rank 3n, and we denote this event by R3. However, the boomerang-type
analysis of [1, 7, 11] instead uses an algebraically less onerous Rank-2n condition,
as illustrated by the matrix U (Section 5) of rank 2n, and we denote this event
by R2. The justification for the application of a boomerang or a related analysis
in the manner of [11] essentially asserts for any cryptographic event A under
consideration that
P(A|R3) = P(A|R2).
There is simply no probabilistic justification for this assertion.
The application of conditional probability to a boomerang-type analysis is
illustrated by the Venn diagram of Figure 2. The boomerang-type analysis of [1,
7, 11] uses
P(A|R2) =
# (A
⋂
R2)
#R2
,
Rank-3n
Rank-2n Condition
EventA
-ﬀ
Fig. 2. Rank-2n and Rank-3n Conditions in the Boomerang Analysis.
whereas the correct condition for a boomerang-type analysis is
P(A|R3) =
# (A
⋂
R3)
#R3
.
There is no probabilistic reason why these two quantities are related in any way.
We can illustrate this by using a fair dice roll with six outcomes {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
as an example. If the dice throw is at most 2, then the conditional probabilities
that the dice roll is odd and that the dice roll is even are given by
P( Dice is Odd | Dice ≤ 2 ) = 1
2
and P( Dice is Even | Dice ≤ 2 ) = 1
2
.
If we replace the condition that the dice throw is at most 2 with the less onerous
condition that the dice throw is at most 3, we obtain the following different
conditional probabilities that the dice roll is odd and the dice roll is even:
P( Dice is Odd | Dice ≤ 3 ) = 2
3
and P( Dice is Even | Dice ≤ 3 ) = 1
3
.
This simple example shows the central importance of the conditioning event.
Arbitrarily replacing one conditioning event by another conditioning event is a
fundamental error in the application of conditional probability.
In the DES and AES boomerang examples which occur with zero probability
(Sections 3 and 6), we have A
⋂
R3 = ∅ even though A
⋂
R2 6= ∅, so
# (A
⋂
R2)
#R2
>
#(A
⋂
R3)
#R3
= 0, that is P(A|R2) > P(A|R3) = 0.
By contrast, in the DES boomerang example of Section 7, the cryptographic event
A is actually a subset of R3, so we have
# (A
⋂
R2)
#R2
=
#(A
⋂
R3)
#R2
<
#(A
⋂
R3)
#R3
, that is P(A|R2) < P(A|R3).
For a boomerang-type analysis to be correct, we require that
P(A|R2) = P(A|R3) =
# (A
⋂
R2)
#R2
=
#(A
⋂
R3)
#R3
.
Loosely speaking, we require that the event A occurs with the same frequency
in the Rank-3n subset as it does in the Rank-2n subset. As stated above, there
is no probabilistic reason for this to be the case, and as the examples of this
paper demonstrate, there is no general cryptographic reason for this to be the
case. A cryptographic boomerang-type analysis that merely swaps the Rank-2n
condition for the Rank-3n condition cannot be regarded as having been substan-
tiated.
9 Comments on a Rectangle Analysis of the AES
An analysis of the AES [9] in a specific related key model is given in [4], and
this analysis makes use of a number of different techniques based on the crypto-
graphic boomerang. The correctness of the boomerang probabilities given by [11]
is asserted by [4], and such values for boomerang probabilities are the founda-
tions of the analysis of the AES given by [4]. As we have shown, such foundations
are not necessarily sound.
We discuss the dubious nature of the AES analysis given by [4] by considering
a critical technique used in this analysis termed the Feistel switch. A value for
the probability that a Feistel switch occurs is given in [4] based on the usual
boomerang reasoning of [11], that is based on a Rank-2n condition rather than
the correct Rank-3n condition. Thus the value given by [4] for the probability
that a Feistel switch occurs is not generally correct. This is illustrated by the
DES boomerang example of Section 3, which is actually a Feistel switch, with
∆X = γ9, ∆Y = 0 and ∆Z = γB in the notation of [4]. Thus it would be asserted
by [4] that this DES example of a Feistel switch, which can never happen, occurs
with nonzero probability.
Another technique used by [4] is termed the S-box switch, which essentially
considers the cryptographic boomerang when ∇∗ = △∗. However, whilst the
Rank-2n condition is used by [4] to give a probability value for the Feistel switch,
the Rank-3n condition is used by [4] to give a probability value for the S-box
switch. This is problematic as the DES boomerang example of Section 7 is es-
sentially both an S-box switch and a Feistel switch, with ∆X = ∆Z = γ9 and
∆Y = 0 in the notation of [4].
These examples show that the justifications for the probability values for var-
ious cryptographic boomerang-type events given by [4] are not really convincing.
The data requirements for the related key analysis of the AES given by [4] cannot
therefore be regarded as having been soundly demonstrated.
10 Conclusions
We have given counterexamples that clearly demonstrate that the justification
for the boomerang analysis given by [11] is highly questionable. These coun-
terexamples are based on the two most important block ciphers, the DES and
the AES, so they are not just artificially contrived. Such counterexamples can
also be adapted to show that the justifications for derived analyses, such as the
amplified boomerang analysis [7] and the rectangle analysis [1], are also highly
questionable. Furthermore, the claims given made by [4] for a related key analysis
of the AES must be regarded as unsubstantiated.
The correct condition for a right quartet in a boomerang-type analysis is
a Rank-3n condition. The boomerang-type analysis replaces the correct right
quartet Rank-3n condition with an algebraically less onerous Rank-2n condition.
Whilst it is possible that, for a particular block cipher and a particular collection
of differences, a probability conditional on the Rank-3n event and a probability
conditional on the Rank-2n event are equal, there is no a priori probabilistic or
cryptographic reason for these two conditional probabilities to be equal. The jus-
tification for the application of a boomerang or a related analysis in the manner
of [11] to a particular block cipher and a particular collection of differences does
clearly require the demonstration that the Rank-3n and Rank-2n conditions give
the same probability.
We have shown that the usual probabilistic argument used to justify the so-
called boomerang effect is unsound. A probability value for a boomerang-type
analysis derived in the manner of [1, 7, 11] can be highly inaccurate and is at best
an arbitrary guess for the true probability. In terms of the original motivation for
the use of the word boomerang to describe this style of cryptographic analysis,
the contribution of this paper can best be summarised as follows:
A cryptographic boomerang need not return from whence it came.
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